The transparency paradox: why transparency alone will not improve campaign regulations by Power, Sam
The transparency paradox: why transparency alone will not 
improve campaign regulations
Article  (Published Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Power, Sam (2020) The transparency paradox: why transparency alone will not improve 
campaign regulations. The Political Quarterly, 91 (4). pp. 731-738. ISSN 0032-3179 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/96919/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
The Transparency Paradox: Why Transparency
Alone will not Improve Campaign Regulations
SAM POWER
Abstract
The role of new sources of data has become of increasing interest to those involved in politi-
cal campaigning and a legislative focus of policy makers and regulators. Utilising Karl-Heinz
Nassmacher’s ‘magic quadrangle’ of ‘accounting, practicality, sanctions and transparency’
and a case study of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 this article
unpicks how successful the ‘guiding philosophy’ of transparency was in delivering increased
citizen confidence in the democratic process. I ultimately argue that at the heart of all discus-
sions about what regulation in this area should look like, an uncomfortable paradox has to
be accepted: that transparency may well help to quell actual instances of malfeasance and
the misuse of data, but may at the same time increase citizen distrust in democratic pro-
cesses. Any regulation should consider the ways in which transparency might be imple-
mented such that it better supports the stated legislative aims.
Keywords: transparency, digital campaigns, political financing, regulation, political parties,
British politics
Introduction
SINCE AT THE very least, the victories of
Donald Trump and the Leave campaign in
the Brexit referendum, the ways in which
new forms of data play a role in political
campaigns (and their eventual outcomes) are
ripe areas of public discourse. Documen-
taries such as Netflix’s The Great Hack and
Channel 4/HBO’s drama Brexit: The Uncivil
War have put digital campaigning at the
front and centre of popular conceptions of
how politics and democracy function in the
twenty-first century (whether entirely accu-
rately is an argument for another day). It is
not surprising, then, that if this challenge
has seeped into the minds of the gatekeepers
of popular culture, it has become a legisla-
tive focus of policy makers and regulators
alike. In the United Kingdom alone, there
have been (at least) fourteen reports written
in recent years which unpick the extent to
which these trends represent a threat to our
democracy as we know it.
For example, in their review of the 2019
general election, the Electoral Commission
showed that public concern surrounding
‘misleading campaign techniques’ (alongside
bias in the media and ‘complaints raising
concerns about the presentation, tone and
content of election campaigns’) was particu-
larly high. This public concern—whilst cer-
tainly reflecting a general as well as
specifically online malaise—was focussed on
digital. More than half of respondents to an
Electoral Commission post-election survey
(58 per cent) agreed that (in general) ‘cam-
paigning online is untrue or misleading’,
with a similar number disagreeing that ‘in-
formation online about politics is trustwor-
thy’. Of the nearly one in five people (18 per
cent) that suggested they were not confident
the election was well run, 49 per cent sug-
gested that this was because ‘campaigning
was based on incorrect information/untrue
claims’. Finally, when respondents were
asked to prioritise their concerns about the
election, 52 per cent said that ‘inadequate
control of political activity on social media’
was a problem.1
This has led the Electoral Commission (in
2020) to reiterate recommendations from
their 2018 report, Digital Campaigning—
Increasing Transparency for Voters, to
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introduce (as a matter of course) rules con-
cerning a ‘digital imprint’.2 This recommen-
dation includes that social media companies
should—if and when this becomes a legal
requirement—make it as easy as possible for
parties and campaigners to comply. The
Commission also argues that legislation
should be put in place to clarify to cam-
paigners and digital platforms the type of
information they give to voters, the media,
other campaigners and regulators. Underpin-
ning all of these recommendations are new
data which suggest that that the public
remains concerned about the transparency of
online political campaigns. The Commission
shows that 72 per cent agreed that it was
important for them to know who produced
political information online, 29 per cent
agreed that they could find out who had pro-
duced the political information they see
online, and 46 per cent were concerned
about why and how political advertising
was targeted at them.3
The striking through line in all of this is
that recommendations surrounding legisla-
tive reform hold transparency mechanisms
as the guiding principle that will, at the very
least, help to deliver renewed confidence in
electoral processes. To return to the Commis-
sion’s report, transparency acts to ‘protect
confidence in how elections are run and
increase trust in campaigns’. Any changes, it
is argued, ‘will benefit voters and improve
public confidence’, and the report concludes
with a heading concerned with ‘secur[ing]
democratic processes’. However, whilst tak-
ing a ‘sunlight is the best disinfectant’
approach is a common regulatory response,
especially with regards to issues surrounding
corruption and/or democratic confidence, it
remains unclear exactly how transparency
achieves these ends.
To reflect on this, this article takes the
view that hindsight is 20/20, and that this is
no bad thing. There is a lot of value in learn-
ing from the past, and in particular recent
legislative changes in the field of political
financing. Taking the United Kingdom as a
case study and, in particular, the successes
(and failures) of the Political Parties, Elec-
tions and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) I
will outline precisely what we can learn
from the guiding philosophy of the reform
itself, and whether this philosophical
underpinning is successful. To do this I
begin by reimagining Karl-Heinz Nass-
macher’s ‘magic quadrangle’ of party fund-
ing, discussing each element in turn, and
demonstrating its relevance to reform in this
field, before arguing that transparency itself
—if implemented imprecisely—may well
undermine the stated aims of legislation in
this area.
The magic quadrangle of party
funding reimagined in the digital
age
In the early 2000s Karl-Heinz Nassmacher
noted that to be effective, all political finance
regimes need to be made up of a ‘magic
quadrangle’ inclusive of professional
accounting by volunteer campaign and party
workers, administrative practicality, the pos-
sibility of sanctions in the event of violations,
and transparency for the general public.
Nassmacher argued that for regulatory suc-
cess to be ensured ‘none of these can be
ignored’ or ‘stand alone in any effort to
frame and implement rules’.4 The magic
quadrangle is of use more as an idealised
standard (not yet fully realised offline) than
something for digital to catch up to, and as
such it can provide a useful benchmark for
designing regulation in both spheres. In the
following, however, I consider Nassmacher’s
four policy responses and relate them to dig-
ital as a means to better understand how
they might more usefully be operationalised
in terms of digital regulation.
Professional accounting by campaign,
party workers (and online platforms)
Nassmacher suggests that for successful
monitoring of party/campaign accounts to
be facilitated by external bodies/actors, these
accounts need to be kept to a professional
standard. In light of digital challenges, this
point of the quadrangle is better understood
as ‘professional accounting by campaign,
party workers and online platforms’ and is
largely a challenge on the same side of the
coin as more general transparency obliga-
tions. This is unsurprising. Nassmacher him-
self argues that transparency is ‘the most
important requirement’ but one that ‘can
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never be achieved completely’.5 It also high-
lights the important role of clear and consis-
tent returns which allow journalists,
armchair auditors and academics the oppor-
tunity to improve their understanding of
ongoing trends and allow for more forward
thinking approaches. Good investigatory
work in this area, both online and off, is
often hampered by a lack of common
accounting practices—and it is no different
in the world of digital. The Facebook ad
archive, for example, contains relatively
sparse data on how an ad has been targeted
(encompassing gender and age, number of
viewers and the broad geographic region
where the ad was viewed), whereas the
Snapchat archive contains considerably more
fine-grained details (right down to electoral
districts).
A key part of the problem for Nassmacher
is that accounting and bookkeeping is often
conducted by volunteer party members, and
whilst amateurism is less of an issue for
employees of Facebook (though platforms
aside, there is plenty of evidence of citizens
taking action in digital with limited exper-
tise) the challenge remains the same. For
example, the current jumbled practices sur-
rounding how data is utilised across plat-
forms suggests that the digital world does
not align with Nassmacher’s quadratic ideal.
Therefore, reform in this area should not
only focus around encouraging campaigners
to provide more detailed invoices with
regards to digital spending and targeting,
but also that online platforms provide con-
sistent data in their advertising archives with
regards to the ways that their tools are used.
Administrative practicality
Secondly, Nassmacher suggests that basic
practicality is essential to the functioning of
a party funding regime, and that this is
strengthened by a clear understanding of
proper administration. In other words, a con-
crete notion of who the regulator is in the
area, what the rules being regulated are and
what powers the regulator has. Moreover,
this regulator must have institutional sup-
port in terms of, amongst other things,
resources and clarity surrounding the rules.
Applying these ideas to the oversight of
digital campaigning, there are a number of
ways in which standards of administrative
practicality are not met. For example,
amongst many of the solutions posited are
calls for greater powers for regulators—in-
cluding far greater funding for the Electoral
Commission (which holds much of the cur-
rent responsibilities in this area)—or
demands for a new regulator. However, at
the forefront of reformers’ deliberations
should be a consideration of what is and
what is not feasible and practical within the
current regime.
Far greater funding for the Commission to
beef up its digital capabilities is unlikely
when it is (more often than not) critiqued
from all sides—from Arron Banks’ ‘Blairite
Swamp Creation’ to Owen Jones’ body
‘which let the Tories off the hook’—and trea-
ted like a referee in a football game.6 It is
disliked by 50 per cent of fans, 50 per cent of
the time, in an often openly partisan manner.
Indeed, even on the Lords’ Democracy and
Digital Technologies Committee—of which
this special issue was partly born—Lord Put-
tnam belied, at the very least, an underlying
antipathy toward the Commission:
This is an observation, I’m very impressed,
personally, with both of you this morning.
You’ve been very frank and very helpful.
Can I say I’m pleasantly surprised. Because
the impression one gets after the event of the
way in which the Electoral Commission
operates is passive and always seems some-
what less than satisfactory. So, in a sense,
there’s a real job to be done on communica-
tions. Because the inference is that there’s
been political interference and you’ve been
told not to rock the boat, not to scare the
horses and give a broad-brush approval to
whatever is going on. So today has been
very encouraging to me personally.7
Therefore, we must ask ourselves, are
any suggestions on increased digital over-
sight plausible without a clearer focus on
increasing the funds of the Electoral Com-
mission? Are these funds likely to be forth-
coming given the position the Commission
often finds itself in? And/or will a pro-
posed new regulator face the same fate as
the (often unfairly) much maligned
Commission.
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Propensity to sanction violations
A close analogue with an effective and sup-
ported regulatory landscape (that is, admin-
istrative practicality) is that sanctions are in
place in the event that rules are broken. That
‘enforcement demands a strong authority
endowed with sufficient legal powers to
supervise, verify, investigate and, if neces-
sary, institute legal proceedings’.8 In terms
of both online and offline campaigning, the
Commission has consistently called for
greater powers and any new regulation in
this area should heed these calls.
However, in terms of digital campaigning,
the argument goes one step further: to what
extent do existing narratives surrounding the
role of online platforms merely rely on their
own good nature? Put another way, if there
are no sanctions in place, and no existing
framework for how platforms should report
digital activity, why should it fall on them to
create them in the first place? In terms of
Nassmacher’s quadrangle, to what extent
does the current emphasis on self-regulation
for online platforms neglect the need for a
‘strong authority’ endowed with ‘sufficient
legal powers’?
There are serious questions to answer
about the fairness and practicality of expect-
ing global platforms merely to adhere to the
democratic norms and standards of a said
jurisdiction. Better to make clear what is and
is not acceptable as a basic rule of the game.
This would mean compelling platforms to
act in accordance with certain principles, but
also involving platforms more holistically in
discussions. This will help to construct basic
codes of conduct which, if not adhered to,
sanctioned consequences follow.
Transparency for the general public
Transparency underpins much of the debate
surrounding both short- and long-term solu-
tions to the ‘digital problem’ and, in terms of
Nassmacher’s quadrangle, is ‘the most impor-
tant requirement’—from the (largely agreed
upon) reform of ‘digital imprints’ which
would mirror the current rules surrounding
offline campaigning, to the more fundamental
sharing of (varying levels of) data between
online platforms, regulators and, privacy con-
cerns notwithstanding, the general public.
Transparency is often seen to be a good in
and of itself (and it is a reflection on these
assumptions to which the majority of the
rest of this article turns). The logic is based
on that of Supreme Court Justice Louis Bran-
deis that, ‘sunlight is the best disinfectant;
electric light the best policeman’.9 Trans-
parency performs two functions: that in
keeping as much as possible in the open,
acts of malfeasance and wrongdoing are less
likely to occur; and that a greater knowledge
of the workings of (various) systems will
lead to greater confidence in these systems
by the public.
The ‘magic quadrangle’ is, actually, more
reminiscent of a pyramid that holds trans-
parency as the ultimate aim in securing con-
fidence in elections. Professional accounting,
administrative practicality, and effective
sanctions, are merely mechanisms that
improve the process of elections and provide
accountability between (and during) them.
These are, in certain senses, inward looking
—yet transparency looks outward. It is pub-
lic facing and therefore allows us to think
about what the effect on the public might be.
However, too often absent from discussions
surrounding the implementation of trans-
parency is the actual effect of it on the pub-
lic. What Nassmacher’s quadrangle does not
do—and, perhaps, is not designed to do—is
explain whether the suggested regulatory
responses are likely to drive the desired out-
comes. Again, taking history as a guide (and
barometer) we can apply this framework to
understand better how effective ‘trans-
parency for the general public’ is. This is
where debates around PPERA can be
instructive, as it was underpinned by the
same quadrangle and the same guiding leg-
islative concerns.
The Political Parties, Elections and
Referendums Act (2000)
PPERA was passed during a period when
standards in public life had come under
increased scrutiny and after the landslide
victory of the Labour Party in 1997, which
had taken charge from a Conservative Party
that had found itself increasingly mired in
scandal and ‘sleaze’. This was the mood
music surrounding PPERA and with its
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enactment ‘almost every aspect of political
finance came under regulatory scrutiny and
control’.10 The legislation itself was passed
largely based on recommendations springing
from the Committee on Standards in Public
Life’s (CSPL) Fifth Report: The Funding of
Political Parties in the United Kingdom, from a
manifesto commitment to ‘oblige parties to
declare the source of all donations over a
minimum figure’ and a declaration during
the 1997 Queen’s Speech that ‘My Govern-
ment will seek to restore confidence in the
integrity of the nation’s political system by
upholding the highest standards of honesty
and propriety in public life. They will con-
sider how the funding of political parties
should be regulated and reformed.’11
We can see in just these examples the
interplay between two perfectly reasonable
principles: that the public ought to have con-
fidence in their political parties and thus the
functioning of elections, and that this is
underpinned and delivered by transparency.
This is reinforced if we look at the wording
of the 1998 CSPL report, which suggested
that whilst not ‘sufficient by itself’, that ‘the
most significant part of our philosophy
depends on transparency’.12 Moreover, that
‘the advantages that can be claimed for
transparency include: (1) the public and the
media know who is financing each political
party; (2) rumour and suspicion wither; (3)
the possibility of secret influence over Minis-
ters or policy is greatly diminished; (4) pub-
lic confidence in the probity of the political
process is raised’.13
Transparency, in this instance, is the com-
mon thread. It is the principle that will deli-
ver greater confidence in the electoral
process. We can trace this from manifesto
commitments, to the Queen’s Speech, to the
1998 report that formed the basis of the leg-
islation and, indeed, the introduction of the
Bill at its second reading by then Home Sec-
retary, Jack Straw:
At the heart of the Bill’s provisions is the
need to ensure that the funding of political
parties is open and transparent. Greater
transparency will not only strengthen the
accountability of political parties but help to
buttress their financial standing. The secrecy
that has hitherto been permitted to political
parties in their funding, and the scandals to
which such secrecy has given rise in recent
years, have undoubtedly left a sour taste. In
contrast, all political parties—and the reputa-
tion of our political system as a whole—will
benefit from the Bill.14
It is worth reflecting on the success of
PPERA in achieving these aims, as this
might well help us to understand what con-
tinued effective regulation in this area could
look like. To what extent did the proposed
transparency regulations actually provide
public confidence in the electoral process
and the party funding regime as a whole? In
other words, if sunlight is the best disinfec-
tant, did the disinfectant work?
Public opinion of political
financing
PPERA had two broad interconnected aims
with regard to its focus on transparency: first
to quell actual offences (which were
nonetheless often recognised to be rare); sec-
ond to quell public perceptions that big
money in politics causes wrongdoing.15 On
the first aim PPERA is largely a success:
transgressions are rare such that ‘genuine
abuse of the system and loop-hole seeking
remained comparatively modest’.16 How-
ever, on the stated second aim—that it
would allow suspicion to wither and as such
raise ‘public confidence in the probity of the
political process’ the Act was far less suc-
cessful. Indeed, sunlight performed less as a
disinfectant and more as, well, a light which,
when switched on, caused the public to
either react to what they saw or have their
worst fears confirmed. This reinforces an
important paradox to consider, which is that
in these terms, the primary problem is ‘not
corruption, crime, tax evasion, undue influ-
ence of fat cats or special interest groups,
but the appearance of corruption, crime or
undue influence’.17
If we look at perceptions data from the
introduction of PPERA to the present day
we see this in stark relief. Public opinion sur-
veys overwhelmingly show that the public
believes that both institutional and individ-
ual donors have too much influence on the
political process. In 2003 the Electoral Com-
mission found that 70 per cent of
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respondents believed that private donors
could buy political influence. In 2013, the
Transparency International Global Corrup-
tion Barometer found that 90 per cent of
respondents considered the government to
be ‘somewhat to entirely’ run by a few big
entities acting in their own best interests.
Finally, an Electoral Reform Society study,
published in 2015, found that 75 per cent of
respondents felt that big donors had too
much influence on the political process, and
65 per cent thought that party donors could
buy honours.18
Bringing digital back in: can
transparency achieve its ultimate
aim?
This suggests that a focus on transparency to
dampen perceptions of the misuse of money
—or data—may well be misplaced. The need
for transparency runs through many of the
230 discrete recommendations proffered by
the fourteen reports outlined in the introduc-
tion to this special section.19 Within these, the
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Com-
mittee (DCMS) argues that ‘the very fabric of
our democracy is threatened’ by trends in dig-
ital campaigning and, as such, what needs to
change ‘is the enforcement of greater trans-
parency in the digital sphere’.20 The Informa-
tion Commissioner’s Office (ICO) suggests
that to retain the ‘confidence of electorates
and the integrity of elections themselves, all of
the organisations involved in political cam-
paigning must use personal information and
these techniques in ways that are transparent,
understood by people and lawful’.21 Finally,
the Electoral Commission report, released in
2018, was titled Digital Campaigning—Increas-
ing Transparency for Voters.
However, in this area transparency is often
viewed with an uncritical eye. It is, if not a
panacea, then a cure-almost-all. Trans-
parency, as a disinfectant, is seen as a ‘good
thing’ with little reflection on the side effects.
It approaches what Elinor Ostrom defines as
a ‘self-evident truth’. A common sense
assumption which leads to ‘proposals to
improve the operation of political systems
that can have the opposite effect’.22 In fact,
the 1998 CSPL report outlines that argu-
ments—‘no longer fashionable’—in favour of
secrecy were considered. However, they lar-
gely covered concerns surrounding rights to
privacy and the effect that secrecy might
have on donations. What was not considered
was the unintended outcome that an increase
in transparency might lead to a decrease in
trust in the system.That ‘by providing a
wealth of new information in an attempt to
allay public concern about probity in public
life, the effect was in part at least to heighten
political sensitivity . . . transparency gener-
ated more concern rather than less’.23 The
benefit we have now, from the history of
PPERA, is that we can consider what these
effects might be.
There is a clear paradox: transparency
might well stem actual instances of wrong-
doing and undoubtedly helps regulators
(and academics) track and trace activity in
this area. However, it might well do all these
things whilst having an inverse effect on
public confidence in the electoral system
itself. To be clear, this is not an argument to
walk back any transparency obligations. It
is, rather, to say that if we are to create effec-
tive regulation in this area, we need to have
a better understanding of what we want this
legislation to achieve. And, further, the ways
in which transparency—at the crux of any
legislative approach—might both underpin
and undermine these aims.
Moreover, Katharine Dommett has also
shown that calls for transparency in terms of
digital campaigning lack precision in other
areas, and that we have different desires for
different types (financial, source, data and
targeting) and forms (audience, discoverabil-
ity, comprehensibility and reliability) of
transparency.24 Added to this, we should
consider norms: that if the fundamental aim
of proposed legislation is to buttress and/or
bolster public support for electoral processes,
a simplistic understanding of transparency
might perform the opposite function. It is
integral that when we think of transparency
we think realistically in terms of a) these
norms and b) what transparency can and
will achieve.
Conclusion
Policy making follows path dependent pro-
cesses.PPERA, after all, is largely based on
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reforms that had worked well at the local
level with the introduction of the Corrupt
and Illegal Practices Prevention Act in
1883.25 It is therefore likely and desirable
that any regulation with regard to digital
campaigning is formed (at least in part)
around the relative successes of PPERA.
However, if it is based on the same assump-
tions and underpinnings—and there is no
reason that it should not be—we should also
consider its failings.
Responding to the challenge of digital
campaigning is a future-facing task. How
can we as interested academics, practitioners,
campaigners and regulators respond not just
to challenges uncovered at past elections, but
actively adapt regulations (and regulators) in
a more fundamentally anticipatory sense?
And yet, in much of the discussion sur-
rounding the rise of digital campaigning,
and the challenge of new sources of data in
campaigns, absent is a reflection on the past
and how debates of the past can help us to
form our future responses. In this article I
have argued that many of the challenges that
are highlighted by the numerous calls for
regulation in this area have been faced
before (if in different circumstances) in and
around the development of PPERA. It is pre-
cisely within these debates, that we can
begin to sketch a picture of the norms that
might underpin any legislative (or regula-
tory) change.
I do not do this because it is a neat anal-
ogy to draw upon, but because the chal-
lenges that are presented are comparable.
Moreover, in many instances they are pre-
sented as both in the same family as, and
reflecting broader challenges to, the financ-
ing of politics. There remains, therefore,
much to learn from the trials and tribulations
surrounding both the passage of PPERA, but
also the working of the legislation in prac-
tice. So, if we are to reflect on what is practi-
cal to achieve in legislative terms and what
ought to be aimed for in normative terms,
we can do much worse than consider this in
a recent context.
Nassmacher’s ‘magic quadrangle’ is a
good place to start. However, with the bene-
fit of hindsight we should not think of pro-
fessional accounting, administrative
practicality, the sanctioning of violations and
(most importantly) transparency without
considering what we want legislation to
achieve, and the ways in which an imprecise
focus on transparency might undermine
these aims. For example, if regulation simply
holds transparency as the solution—without
a similar focus on citizen engagement and
digital literacy—it is likely to fail to ‘resur-
rect’ trust in the democratic process.26 Trans-
parency obligations are important for
regulators to undertake their work, for jour-
nalists to uncover wrongdoing, and for aca-
demics to conduct studies. But any reflection
on the future of digital, and the role of trans-
parency in this future, should consider the
ways in which it might be implemented such
that it better supports its basic legislative
aims.
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